A cost-benefit approach to labor market reform

Labor reforms in Latin America have been scarce compared with the pace of structural reforms aimed at liberalizing product and capital markets. Some analysts contend that without continued liberalization labor market performance will fail to improve, hindering Latin American economies’ ability to compete in international markets. ; This article assesses labor market regulations in Latin America, documents their recent history, and assesses their costs and benefits. The author argues that existing regulatory systems, while generating costs in terms of labor market performance, constitute the base (albeit imperfect) of social protection policies in Latin America. ; Compared with industrialized countries, Latin American countries have more protective labor regulations governing working conditions and job security but lower social security benefits. Evidence from the existing literature points to sizable negative effects of mandatory benefits, particularly social security contributions, on employment. Job security provisions tend to bias employment toward prime-age workers and away from younger and less skilled workers. ; Since the demand for social protection in Latin America appears to be large, the author argues that reforms that seek only labor market deregulation do not address this demand. It is tempting to conclude that the solution lies in designing and implementing less costly social protection mechanisms, but the alternatives are not exempt from costs and are not warranted to improve upon existing systems. In these circumstances, the author recommends a mix of research, policy experimentation, and policy evaluation to find solutions that maximize benefits while minimizing costs.Economic stabilization ; Labor market

Who Benefits from Labor Market Regulations? Chile 1960-1998

Economists have examined the impact of labor market regulations on the level of employment. However, there are many reasons to suspect that the impact of regulations differs across types of workers. In this paper we take advantage of the unusual large variance in labor policy in Chile to exa mine how different labor market regulations affect the distribution of employment and the employment rates across age, gender and skill levels. To this effect, we use a sample of repeated cross-section household surveys spanning the period 1960-1998 and measures of the evolution of job security provisions and minimum wages across time. Our results suggest large distribution effects. We find that employment security provisions and minimum wages reduce the share of youth and unskilled employment as well as their employment rates. We also find large effects on the distribution of employment between women and men.

Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean

This paper summarizes the main lessons learned from Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean, a forthcoming NBER book. It places Latin American economies and economic policies in a world context. The paper quantifies the cost of regulation in Latin America and OECD Europe and discusses the origin of regulation. It shows the fragility of time series data analyses of the sort widely used to analyze the impact of regulation in OECD Europe and the benefits of using microdata data. The evidence shows that regulation reduces labor market flexibility, reduces the employment of marginal workers and generates inequality in the larger society.

Are all labor regulations equal ? Assessing the effects of job security, labor dispute, and contract labor laws in India

This paper studies the economic effects of legal amendments on different types of labor laws. It examines the effects of amendments to labor dispute laws and amendments to job security legislation. It also identifies the effects of legal amendments related to the most contentious regulation of all-Chapter Vb of the Industrial Disputes Act-which stipulates that firms with 100 or more employees cannot retrench workers without government authorization. The analysis finds that laws that increase job security or increase the cost of labor disputes substantially reduce registered sector employment and output but do not increase the labor share. Labor-intensive industries, such as textiles, are the hardest hit by laws that increase job security while capital-intensive industries are most affected by higher labor dispute resolution costs. The paper concludes that widespread and increasing use of contract labor may have brought some output and employment gains but did not make up for the adverse effects of job security and dispute resolution laws.Labor Markets,Labor Standards,Labor Management and Relations,Public Sector Regulation,Legal Products

Is Informality a Good Measure of Job Quality? Evidence from Job Satisfaction Data

The formality status of a job is the most widely used indicator of job quality in developing countries. However, a number of studies argue that, at least for some workers, the informality status may be driven by choice rather than exclusion. This paper uses job satisfaction data from three low-income countries (Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) to assess whether informal jobs are less valued than formal jobs. The paper finds substantial differences in job satisfaction within different types of informal jobs. More importantly, the results suggest that across different definitions, informality does not yield the same ranking of job quality as self-reported measures of job satisfaction. This correspondence varies across countries, and it seems to be lower for less-skilled workers.Job Satisfaction, Informality, Quality of Employment, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala.

The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets

This paper documents the high level of job security protection in Latin American labor markets and analyzes its impact on employment. We show that job security policies have substantial impact on the level and the distribution of employment in Latin America. They reduce employment and promote inequality. The institutional organization of the labor market affects both employment and inequality.

Who Is Claiming For Fixed-Term Contracts?

The present study aims to contribute to the debate concerning the effects on economic performance and the structure of the labor market of regulations that combine high Employment Protection Legislations (EPL) with consent for the use of fixed-term contracts (FTC). Using a Rajan and Zingales (1998) difference-in-difference empirical technique in a panel of 45 countries, we explore the response of industries that differ in their "intrinsic need" of worker turnover when they face different levels of EPL and how the possibility of using FTC might change the outcome. Our approach suggests an original demand side explanation of the claiming of FTC.Employment protection legislation, labor turnover, fixed term contracts

Who benefits from labor market regulations? Chile 1960-1998

Economists have examined the impact of labor market regulations on the level of employment. But there are many reasons to suspect that the impact of regulations differs across types of workers. In this paper the authors take advantage of the unusually large variance in labor policy in Chile to examine how different labor market regulations affect the distribution of employment and the employment rates across age, gender, and skill levels. To this effect, they use a sample of repeated cross-section household surveys spanning the period 1960-98 and measures of the evolution of job security provisions and minimum wages across time. The results suggest large distribution effects. The authors find that employment security provisions and minimum wages reduce the share of youth and unskilled employment as well as their employment rates. They also find large effects on the distribution of employment between women and men.Labor Policies,Labor Management and Relations,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Health Promotion,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Labor Management and Relations,Labor Standards,Youth and Governance

Does expanding health insurance beyond formal-sector workers encourage informality ? measuring the impact of Mexico's Seguro Popular

Seguro Popular was introduced in 2002 to provide health insurance to the 50 million Mexicans without Social Security. This paper tests whether the program has had unintended consequences, distorting workers'incentives to operate in the informal sector. The analysis examines the impact of Seguro Popular on disaggregated labor market decisions, taking into account that program coverage depends not only on the individual's employment status, but also that of other household members. The identification strategy relies on the variation in Seguro Popular's rollout across municipalities and time, with the difference-in-difference estimation controlling for household fixed effects. The paper finds that Seguro Popular lowers formality by 0.4-0.7 percentage points, with adjustments largely occurring within a few years of the program's introduction. Rather than encouraging exit from the formal sector, Seguro Popular is associated with a 3.1 percentage point reduction (a 20 percent decline) in the inflow of workers into formality. Income effects are also apparent, with significantly decreased flows out of unemployment and lower labor force participation. The impact is larger for those with less education, in larger households, and with someone else in the household guaranteeing Social Security coverage. However, workers pay for part of these benefits with lower wages in the informal sector.Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Labor Markets,Labor Policies,Housing&Human Habitats,Population Policies

Financial Dependence, Formal Credit and Informal Jobs - New Evidence from Brazilian Household Data

This paper examines a much overlooked link between credit markets and formalization: since access to bank credit typically requires compliance with tax and employment legislation, firms are more likely to incur such formalization costs once bank credit is more widely available at lower cost. The relevance of this credit channel is gauged using the Rajan-Zingales measure of financial dependence and a difference-in-differences approach applied to household survey data from Brazil. It is found that formalization rates increase with financial deepening, especially in sectors where firms are typically more dependent on external finance. Also found is that, decomposing shifts in formalization rates into those within each firm size category and those between firm sizes, financial deepening significantly explains the former but not so much the latter. Some key policy implications are derived.Credit Markets, Financial Dependence, Informality, Brazil